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How did the Eurozone crisis aﬀect the balance of power between the EU’s institutions? As Eugénia
da Conceição-Heldt writes, opinion has been split over whether the crisis strengthened or
damaged the European Commission’s role in EU decision-making. She argues that while some
authors have highlighted an apparent increase in the Commission’s responsibilities over economic
governance during the crisis, the Commission actually experienced a ‘subtle disempowerment’ in
relation to other institutions such as the European Central Bank.
In a recent article, Michael W. Bauer and Stefan Becker argue that the Eurozone crisis allowed the
European Commission to strengthen its role in economic governance, in particular with regard to its implementation
powers, emerging as an ‘unexpected winner’ from the crisis.
By mapping central changes to the implementation powers of the Commission in economic governance throughout
the Eurozone crisis, they certainly provide an enlightening take on the changing power of the Commission. While I
agree with many of their observations about the Commission, some of their conclusions concerning the
empowerment of the Commission are disputable. I would challenge their claim by contending that we have instead
witnessed a ‘subtle disempowerment’ of the Commission: there has been a gradual transfer of decision-making
authority and resources away from the Commission to the intergovernmental level and to the European Central
Bank (ECB) during the crisis. This disempowerment has taken place along three dimensions.
First, with the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) , Member States deliberately decided to
strengthen intergovernmentalism at the expense of the Commission. Whereas in 2010 the President of the
European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, suggested creating a European Monetary Fund to address future
sovereign debt crises, Member States opposed increasing the power of the Commission on economic and ﬁnancial
issues. Instead, they decided to establish a new intergovernmental organisation, the ESM. This institution is now in
charge of safeguarding ﬁnancial stability within the euro area and providing ﬁnancial assistance when necessary to
euro area Member States. Contrary to Bauer and Becker’s claims, recent EU studies persuasively demonstrate that
the ESM disempowers the Commission and that the Fiscal Compact empowers the Commission to an only limited
degree.
Second, the establishment of the so called ‘Troika’ weakened the Commission. One of the Commission’s central
competences is to oversee the implementation of economic and ﬁnancial policies at the national level. During the
Eurozone crisis, Member States, in particular Germany, opposed giving the Commission power on these issues due
to its lack of technical expertise in administering ﬁnancial bailout assistance programmes. Member States decided
instead to divide responsibility for implementing the programmes between the ‘Troika’ of the Commission, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the ECB.
Under this arrangement, the Commission and the IMF were in charge of designing and monitoring macro-economic,
ﬁscal, ﬁnancial sector and structural policies, while the ECB provided liquidity assistance to banks in programme
countries. The Commission not only lost power: Member States also increased oversight mechanisms for this
institution during the Eurozone crisis. Unlike the IMF and the ECB, which performed their tasks unsupervised and
were only informally accountable to Member States, the Commission was extensively scrutinised and held
accountable to Member States at diﬀerent levels. For example, the Commission had to report regularly to the
Economic and Financial Aﬀairs Council, to the Eurogroup and to several economic and ﬁnancial working groups
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within the Council.
Finally, the extension of powers in relation to ﬁnancial
governance at the supranational level weakened the
Commission and empowered the ECB. For example,
in June 2013, the internal market commissioner,
Michael Barnier, presented a report on the regulation
of the EU banking sector in which he suggested that
the Commission, under the lead of the Directorate
General for Internal Market, Economic Aﬀairs or
Competition, was the most suitable and competent
institution to supervise the banking sector. The
Commission even considered that empowering the
ECB in this area was out of the question due to
possible conﬂicts of interest between the ECB’s
responsibilities for regulating monetary policy and its
commitment to ensuring ﬁnancial stability.
However, the Commission’s proposal garnered major opposition from the German ﬁnance minister, Wolfgang
Schäuble, who opposed transferring further competences to this supranational institution. In the end, Member States
decided to delegate substantial powers for banking supervision not to the Commission but to the ECB. Not only is
the newly created European Banking Authority now formally subordinate to the ECB, but the European Systemic
Risk Board, operational since 2011, is also chaired by the ECB President. As these examples show, the ECB has
been extensively empowered since the onset of the Eurozone crisis, leaving the Commission ‘the loser’ in banking
and ﬁnancial supervision.
If one frames articles on European integration in terms of “who wins what, how, where, and when”, then including
the EU institutional context is crucial to understanding whether the Commission was empowered relative to other
European institutions. By omitting other central actors, such as the ECB or the ESM, Bauer and Becker cannot
persuasively answer the question of who the ‘unexpected winners’ of the Eurozone crisis were. This lacuna, in turn,
leads to inaccurate conclusions about the role and power of the Commission during the crisis.
In future, we need more systematic studies addressing the broader question of the conditions under which some
supranational organisations are empowered and others disempowered. In addition, we need studies that concretely
examine which of the Commission’s competences, beyond implementation powers, were strengthened during the
Eurozone crisis and which were weakened. Doing so will help us better understand the extent of the institutional
changes that have taken place since the beginning of the crisis.
For a longer discussion of this topic, see the author’s recent article in the Journal of European Integration
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics. Featured image: the silhouette of former European Commission President José
Manuel Barroso (credits: European Parliament). 
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